

## Arab Agriculture and the WTO Trade Negotiations: Opportunities and Challenges \*

Nasredin Elamin <sup>1</sup> and Mohamed A. Adam <sup>2</sup>

### Summary

The multilateral trade liberalisation in agriculture is crucial for the Arab countries as a whole, in view of their high dependence on food imports, the increasing scarcity in water supplies they are facing and the vital importance they attach to Arab regional integration in agriculture. Only 11 of the Arab countries are currently members of the WTO. The commitments made by these countries in the context of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) seem to provide sufficient flexibility at present, but are likely to constitute some limitation in designing agricultural policies in the future, particularly in the areas of domestic support, export subsidies and access to safeguard measures.

The major concerns of the Arab countries in the ongoing and future multilateral negotiations on agriculture include i) the terms of accession to the WTO; ii) ensuring enough flexibility to developing their domestic capacities in agriculture; iii) improved access to foreign markets; and iv) stability in domestic agriculture and food markets. Assessment of the effects of further multilateral trade reforms on Arab agriculture, using the global agricultural trade policy simulation model (ATPSM), suggests that the Arab countries as a whole will gain little improvement in total welfare and will experience increased deficit in their agricultural trade.

**Keywords:** WTO; AoA; ATPSM.

### Introduction

The multilateral trade negotiations on agriculture hold significant implications for agriculture and food security in the Arab countries. The Arab countries are highly diverse in terms of their economic and geographical size, natural resource endowments and standards of living. Some are exporters of temperate products, some export tropical products, while others have virtually little or no agricultural exports. Nonetheless, these countries share several common characteristics that necessitate their joint action to establish common positions in their negotiations.

At present only 11 of the Arab countries are members of the WTO. These include Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Seven countries are in the process of accession to the WTO. Five of these (Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen) have their working parties established and negotiations are currently underway, while the other two (Libya and Iraq) have their working parties established but negotiations have not started as yet.

This paper attempts to examine the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) by the Arab country members of the WTO and assess the possible implications for Arab's agriculture of further multilateral reforms in agriculture. Section 2 examines common issues on food and agriculture in the Arab region that make countries share similar concerns about the multilateral negotiations on agriculture. Section 3 describes major commitments made by the Arab countries in the AoA. Section 4 addresses some of related issues at stake relating, while section 5 assesses possible impact of different multilateral trade reform scenarios-

gypt on trade flows and total welfare of the Arab countries.

### Major Food and Agriculture Issues in the Arab Countries and their Relationship to the Multilateral Reforms of Agriculture

Despite the wide diversity in the structure of agricultural production and trade among countries in the region, they share several common characteristics. The following are common issues faced by countries in the region, though there are some differences in significance for each of them.

**High dependence on food imports** - Most of the Arab countries are net food importers with high dependence on food imports. For the Arab countries as a whole, import of cereals, as a proportion of the total annual consumption, expanded from 31% in 1970-75 to 49% in 1990-95 and to 55% in 1997-2001. The import dependence vary considerably between countries. In 1999-2001, for instance, 10 of the Arab countries imported more than 90% of their requirements of cereals. Such dependence was disquieting to policy makers, who feared that reliance on foreign supplies is too risky whether economically or politically. Because of this high import dependence, the multilateral trade negotiations has prompted widespread concern in the region, as it is expected to reduce subsidised food exports and result in some increase in world food prices. Although oil exporters are unlikely to face significant challenges to their ability to import food, the non-oil exporters face greater challenges. The low income countries in the region, in particular, are facing difficulties in developing adequate foreign exchange earnings to finance food imports.

**Scarcity and variability of water supplies**- Scarcity of water constitutes the most formidable challenge to agriculture in the Arab countries. The World Bank reported that, by year 2025 renewable water supplies in almost all the countries in the Middle East and North Africa will fall below 700 CM, compared with a world-wide per caput of

1 FAO, Regional Office for the Near East, Cairo, Egypt, Fax: (+202) 7495981 or 3373419, E-mail: Nasredin.Elamin@fao.org

2 FAO, Regional Office for the Near East, E-mail: mohamed\_abdelgadir@hotmail.com

\* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent a position of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

**Table 1.** Arab Country WTO Members: Bound and Applied Tariffs for Selected Agricultural Commodities <sup>/1</sup>

	Bahrain		Djibouti		Egypt		Kuwait		Jordan		Mauritania		Morocco		Oman		Tunisia	
	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied	bound	applied
Wheat	35	5	40	5	5	1	100	0	0	0	75	0	170	56	5	0	98	66
Rice	35	5	40	30	30	20	100	0	5	5	75	20	155	91	5		60	35
Barley	35	5	40	10	10	5	100	0	9	0	75	2	50	27	5		75	73
Beef	35	5	40	10	10	5	100	0	5	17.4	50	20	239	189	5	0	75	73
Live sheep	35	5	40	10	10	5	100	0	5.1	5	25	na	62	329	5	na	180	
Sheep & goat meat	35	5	40	5	5	5	100	0	5.5	5.1			289		7	0	100	115
Poultry meat	35	5	40	60	60		100	0					101				75	
Tomatoes	35	5	40	20	20	0	100	0	30		50	13	34	40	64	5	150	
Potatoes	35	3.8	40	10	10	5.3	100	0	30.8	17.9	50	5	34	50	54	5	150	69
Citrus fruit	35	5	40	60	60	40	100	0	32.4	32.1	30	20	34		15	5	200	200
Olive oil	35	5	40	20	20	12.5	100	0	30	na	30	5	34		14	8	120	115
Milk	35	5	40	60.3	60.3	25	100	0	20	30	7	5	87	109	75	0	180	180
Sugar	35	5	40	21.3	21.3	8.5	100	0	13.6	19	50	5.2	164	36	7	2	100	18.2

<sup>/1</sup>Notes:

\* Applied tariffs are for the year 2004 for Tunisia, 2003 for Jordan and Morocco, 2002 for Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, and 2001 for Bahrain and Mauritania;

\* na = not available

Source: World Bank (2005).

more than 5000 CM. Scarcity of water means increasing dependence on the international market for supply of basic food and other agricultural commodities. Therefore, increases in world market prices for agricultural products, as a result of multilateral trade liberalisation, may imply increased drain on water resources. In addition, commitments in the context of the WTO imply a reduction in subsidies for irrigation water. Reducing water subsidy is, however, extremely difficult because of the complicated political, religious and social constraints surrounding the issue of water pricing in the region. Trade liberalisation in the context of the WTO, therefore, needs to be taken in tandem with a reform of water and other environmental resource prices. What is required is a judicious mix of reforms to prices of agricultural commodities, water and land.

**Trade preferences-** Many of the Arab countries receive preferential treatment from the developed countries (EU, the US and Japan, etc.) under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and other preferential trade agreements. The North Africa countries, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon receive preferential treatment through bilateral agreements with the EU. Other countries such as Egypt, Mauritania, Somalia and Tunisia receive GSP from the US. In addition, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan receive special treatment from the EU because of their status as ACP countries in the context of the Cotonou Agreement and as LDCs in the context of the Everything but Arms (EBA). One of the major consequences of the WTO reforms in agriculture is the erosion of the value of these preferences.

**Regional integration schemes-** Regional integration in agriculture continues to be an issue of great concern in the Arab world. The present interest in regional agreements has

its origin in the belief that close regional co-operation will provide an economic defence against shifting patterns of trade and investment, particularly after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of huge regional economic blocks such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) etc. In the long run, the WTO is expected to induce significant impact on the number and type of regional trading agreements (RTAs) in the Arab world mainly because Article XXIV of GATT 1947 and the Uruguay Round Understanding on the interpretation of the same Article, which only permit customs unions and free trade areas satisfying strict criteria. Thus, all regional agreements not concurring with these criteria would need to be adjusted in order to comply with the WTO rules. In addition, the gradual multilateral liberalisation of agriculture is expected to have profound effects on the direction of agricultural trade both within the Arab world and between the Arab countries and the rest of the world.

### Main Features of Commitments made by the Arab Countries in the context of the AoA

This Section examines the actual commitments made by the Arab country members of the WTO in the areas of market access, domestic support and export subsidies.

#### Market access

The market access provisions of the UR AoA include i) tariffication; ii) binding and reduction of tariffs; iii) the Special Safeguard (SSG) provisions, where tariffication has been carried out; and iv) the introduction of tariff quotas to protect current access arrangements and to open up new import possibilities under the minimum access arrangements (WTO, 1995)

**Tariffication and tariff binding-** As several of the WTO members of the region had already converted non-tariff barriers into tariffs as part of their domestic policy reforms, the Arab countries did not seem to be faced with any difficulties in converting non-tariffs barriers into tariffs. Based on UR modalities, developing countries had a choice to bind tariffs at their tariff equivalents or to offer ceiling tariffs without regard to tariff equivalents. All the Arab countries, apart from Morocco and Tunisia, have chosen the second option, setting their tariffs at relatively high ceiling bindings.

As can be seen from Table (1) three observations on tariffs commitments (bound tariffs) made by the Arab country WTO members are worth noting:

- For the countries as a group, average bound tariffs are generally high but yet they are still low compared with tariffs for several other developing countries;
- Bound tariffs for individual products vary considerably across the region. Tariffs for wheat, for instance, range from as low as 5% in Egypt to as high as 170% in Morocco. Generally, bound tariffs are relatively low for countries such as Jordan, Oman and Egypt. For Jordan and Oman, this was basically because of the tough negotiations they faced on tariff binding;
- With the exception of Jordan, bound tariffs are very high compared with applied tariffs.

**Special safeguards-** Only two of the Arab countries have access to the special safeguards (SSGs). By virtue of their tariffication, Morocco and Tunisia, and in accordance with Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, have reserved the right to invoke the Special Safeguard clause for selected agricultural products.

**Tariff rate quotas-** Morocco and Tunisia undertook to introduce tariff quotas on certain agricultural products. Tariff quotas in Morocco (16 tariff quotas) are planned mainly for meat, milk, cereals, oil seeds, sugar and oil cake, while in Tunisia (13 tariff quotas) they cover meat, milk powder, cereals, sugar and tomato concentrate.

The Arab countries faced considerable questioning at the WTO Committee on Agriculture (CoA) on their market access commitment under its respective tariff and other commitments. Almost all questions on market access were directed to countries which have a bigger weight in world trade of the specific product(s). The bulk of the questions on tariffs were related to what can be considered sensitive food products in the region which are also of interest to the exporting countries (mainly USA, EU and the CAIRNS). For instance, Egypt was frequently questioned on its restrictions on beef and poultry meat and Morocco on its Traffic Rate Quates (TRQ) on wheat and oilseeds.

#### **Domestic support**

Domestic support has been categorised into exempt support (green box, blue box, developmental measures) and non-exempt support (amber box). For brief definition and details of these boxes see WTO (2005) and FAO (2000).

Countries of the Arab region differ widely in their submissions to the WTO on domestic support. Most of the

countries did not provide detailed information on domestic policy measures in their accession Schedules. Of the 11 Arab country members of the WTO, 8 reported zero or less than de minimis total base Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) levels. Thus, these countries have no rights to use amber box support in excess of the de minimis level in the future. Only Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have Total AMS reduction commitments. Although many of the Arab countries are not currently constrained by the domestic support provisions of the Agreement, they may find their policy options limited in the future.

An issue of concern for the Arab countries is related to the fact that product-specific support is generally devoted mainly to production of basic foodstuffs. On average, more than 70 percent of the Current Total AMS notified by these countries was allocated to the production of cereals. In some cases, such support is near the allowed product-specific de minimis level. Thus, while the de minimis exemption is unused for many products in these countries, it may constrain their support of basic food production. Sector-wide support in areas such as agricultural credit, transport, irrigation and fuel are important aspects of the development strategies of many of the Arab countries, and additional flexibility in their use may be needed.

#### **Export subsidies**

While export subsidies are used by a number of the developing regions, it does not seem to be significant one in the Arab Region. Only Tunisia of the Arab WTO members had made commitments on the reduction of export subsidies. The rest of the countries in the region declared that they had no export subsidy in their base year. These countries are, therefore, restricted in what they can do in this area in the future: they are not allowed to use export subsidies in the future. They can only provide support reduce marketing and transport of agricultural exports under the general exemption for developing country on this issue.

### **Issues at Stake for the Arab Countries in the Current Round of Negotiations on Agriculture**

The experience with the implementation of the AoA and the on-going WTO negotiations on agriculture offer opportunities for efficiency and growth in Arab s agriculture, but they also pose formidable challenges. Three areas of concern raised by these countries are particularly important: terms of accession to the WTO; developing domestic capacities in agriculture; access to foreign markets; and stability in domestic markets.

#### **The terms of accession to the WTO**

The overwhelming concern for the non-WTO members in the Arab world has been the terms of accession to the WTO. The 5 Arab countries currently negotiating their accession to the WTO (Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen) are facing some considerable institutional challenges in their accession process. The countries that joined recently, Jordan and Oman, were asked to provide more concessions compared with the countries that joined before 1995.

Non-WTO member countries of the region are also concerned about the setting of the terms of accession post-Uruguay Round. Treating countries on the basis of the most recent three years for which data were available and hard negotiations on the tariff ceiling bindings were seen as being tighter conditions than previous negotiations. Saudi Arabia, at some stages of its negotiations of accession, also faced the possibility of not being treated as a developing country, which if applied would deprive Saudi Arabia from all the privileges offered to developing countries in the context of the special and differential treatment.

#### **Developing domestic capacities in agriculture**

In most of the Arab countries, developing agricultural is vital for rural development and food security. Thus, enhancing the domestic capacities of the sector is crucial for the socio-economic development in these countries. It is generally argued that while the AoA provides for special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries and has a number of provisions on the subject, these provisions have been seen as falling short of what is necessary and as failing to provide the requisite policy flexibility. In this context, many developing countries have drawn a distinction between the protection and support measures used in developed countries that distort world markets and those used by developing countries to ensure food security, to promote broader economic development, or to diversify their agricultural exports. In the Arab countries, in particular, where agriculture is highly linked to food security and rural development, a degree of support and protection is considered necessary. While many of the Arab countries have at present some flexibility in policy areas such as tariffs and support through the various forms of exempt support, they still face great limitation, particularly in the long run, for providing direct support to diversification in production and exports. As explained above, the flexibility of most of the Arab countries to provide support through amber box and export subsidies is fairly limited.

#### **Access to the agricultural markets of the developed countries**

Challenges facing the WTO Members in the region originated not only from meeting their own commitments but mainly from the way developed countries have implemented their commitments. The post-UR tariff profile of many developed countries is typically characterised by high tariffs on product of export interest to the Arab countries. Another significant constraint for countries of the region is the special provision for the EU to adopt the entry price system in fruit and vegetables, which are important export commodities for the Arab countries. This has limited scope entry of the these country exports to the EU. In addition, the Special Safeguards (SSG) for products of fruit and vegetables, both a price-triggered and a quantity-triggered versions, have been used.

The minimum and current access commitments made by the developed countries also do not favour major export crops of the region. In the EU, the biggest market for the Arab countries, minimum and current access commitments

were set for cuts of high quality beef, pig meat, poultry meat, eggs, butter, specified cheeses and quality wheat, products which are generally not exported by countries of the region. In its minimum access commitments the EU has aggregated all vegetables into one category and all fruit into another.

Erosion of the value of trade preferences constitutes another problem for the region. To the extent that tariffs reduction in the developed countries were effective they will erode the countries' margins of preference and cause their competitive position to deteriorate vis-à-vis other suppliers. An example of the preference erosion is the case of asparagus where Morocco can export it duty free to the EU, while exports of the same product from USA and Chile must pay 16% tariff. Under the UR AoA the 16% MFN tariff will be reduced to 10% cutting the advantage that Morocco enjoys by 6%.

Tariff escalation also remained a barrier to the processed food exports of the region. Although tariff escalation in the fruit and vegetables sector is reduced in the EU, US and Japan post-Uruguay Round, it still remains considerable (Elamin and Khaira, 2004). In addition, difficulties and high costs in complying with SPS standards in the EU markets remain a barrier to exports from the Arab countries.

The above mentioned problem areas are of particular concern to the Arab countries, for they directly affect the translation of the Uruguay Round commitments into real trading opportunities, and they are likely to constitute issues of interest for these countries in future negotiations.

#### **Stability in domestic markets**

Access to WTO-compatible safeguard measures is a great concern for many of the Arab countries.

Many of these countries face major problems of vulnerability to external agricultural market instability and to import surges (temporary sharp rises in imports) that could damage agricultural production activities. Numerous and increasing occurrences of import surges have been reported in several of the Arab countries.

The Arab countries are faced with two difficulties in their effort to safeguard their domestic agricultural markets. First, most of them, apart from Morocco and Tunisia, do not have access to special agricultural safeguards. The special agricultural safeguards (SSG) provisions allow an importer to increase tariffs above bound levels in response to a surge in imports or a decline in import prices. Second, most of these countries also have difficulty using WTO general contingent trade protection measures. The use of these general contingent trade protection measures are very demanding financially, technically and legally as they require proof of injury.

#### **Assessment of the impact of multilateral trade reforms on the Arab s agriculture**

Using the UNCTAD-FAO Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM), a simple exercise has been undertaken to simulate the effects of multilateral trade reforms on Arab s agriculture. ATPSM is a partial equilibrium mod-

el very rich with agricultural trade policy specifications and covers all the WTO member countries. It allows simulation of impact of changes in trade-related policy measures such as tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), export subsidies and domestic support in the WTO members. For detailed description of the model see Poonyth and Sharma, 2003. It has the advantage of allowing the analyst to examine impacts of changes in policy measures at the global, regional or country levels on such variables as world prices, domestic prices, trade flows, production, consumption and total welfare.

We establish specific group for the Arab countries, including 17 countries for which data is available, 8 of which are WTO Members. These countries include Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and UAE as WTO members and Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen as non-WTO members. The 36 products of the model were included in the analysis. These products include all the important agricultural products in the Arab countries apart from wheat flour.

Two scenarios were developed: i) the application of a reform package similar to that adopted during the Uruguay Round (UR); and ii) the extreme case of complete liberalization of agricultural trade by all WTO Members. Table (2) shows the percentage reduction in tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support in each scenario.

**Table 2.** Simulated Reduction Scenarios

Country	Uruguay Round Formula Rate cut (%)			Free trade Scenario Rate cut (%)		
	Tariffs	Export subsidy	Domestic support	Tariffs	Export subsidy	Domestic support
Domestic support	36	21	20	100	100	100
Developed countries	24	14	14	100	100	100

The first scenario of the Uruguay Round represents a closer position to that of the EU, Japan and several other big trading countries in the context of the on-going WTO negotiations. This is considered to be the most conservative position in the ongoing negotiations. The second scenario of free trade, although is very unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future, gives insight of the extreme case if all tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support for agricultural products are completely removed by all WTO Members. In other words these are the two extreme scenarios, where all the proposals in the ongoing negotiations fall in between. Assessing the impact of these extreme scenarios will give a good indication of the likely outcome of proposals that fall between them, such as those of the G-20, G-33 and the US. For details on these proposals see the WTO website.

The model offers a good number of impact indicators including changes in world prices of 36 commodities, production, consumption, trade, trade balance, domestic consu-

mer and farm prices, tariff quota rents, government revenue as well as changes in welfare. However, for the purpose of the article, our discussion is confined only to the impact on trade revenues and total welfare.

**Impact on export earnings, import cost and trade balance**

Table (3) shows the results of the simulated impact of the two scenarios on agricultural trade flows and trade balance in the Arab countries. It is interesting that both scenarios led to increase in agricultural (basically food) imports of the Arab countries from their base year. However, in both cases the trade balance deteriorated significantly basically because in relative terms agricultural exports are fairly low compared with agricultural imports. These results suggest that for the Arab countries as a whole, and if business continues as usual, any further multilateral trade

**Table 3.** ATPSM results: Impact of scenarios on agricultural trade revenue

	Agric exports Million US\$		Agricultural imports Million US\$		Trade balance Million US\$	
	Value	% change	Value	% change	Value	% change
UR	3,164	11	16,782	6	-13,618	5
Free Trade	4,447	56	20,081	27	-15,633	20

liberalisation in agriculture will exacerbate the current deficit in agricultural trade and food gap in the region.

**Impact on total welfare**

Total welfare the ATPSM is the sum of producer and consumer surpluses and government revenue. Table (4) below summarizes the overall impact of trade liberalization on Arab countries in terms of the total welfare (disaggregated in its constituents of consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue).

**Table 4.** ATPSM Results: Impact of scenarios on total welfare (in US\$ Millions)

Simulated scenarios/ results	Change in consumers Surplus	Change in Producers Surplus	Change in government revenue	Change in Total Welfare
Uruguay Round Formula	937	-918	226	226
Free Trade Scenario	5,038	-3,847	-1,106	-1,106

Results for two scenarios show similar trends in terms of the direction of change, where in both the region experiences loss in producer surpluses and gains in consumer surpluses. However, the magnitude of change differs slightly from the general trends; while the total welfare increases with application of UR scenario it declines with the free trade scenario. This suggests that producers are likely to lose with multilateral trade reforms if the current setting of resource availability and institutional arrangements are kept around the same.

## References

- Elamin N. and Khaira H. 2004. Tariff Escalation in Agricultural Commodity Markets. FAO Commodity Market Review, 2003-2004, FAO, Rome.
- FAO 2000. Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: A Resource Manual, FAO, Rome.
- Poonyth, D. and Sharma, R. 2003. The Impact of the WTO Negotiating Modalities in the Areas of Domestic Support, market access and export competition on developing countries:

- Results from ATPSM. Paper presented at the International Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we heading? Capri, Italy, June 2003.
- WTO 1995. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts. WTO, Geneva.
- WTO 2005. Domestic Support in Agriculture: The Boxes. [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/agric\\_e/agboxes\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.pdf).
- World Bank 2005. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database and Software. World Bank, Washington D.C., USA.

## الزراعة العربية والمفاوضات التجارية لمنظمة التجارة العالمية: الفرص والتحديات

نصر الدين الأمين<sup>1</sup> و محمد عبدالقادر آدم<sup>2</sup>

### الخلاصة

إن لمفاوضات تحرير التجارة الزراعية (متعددة الأطراف) أهمية خاصة للدول العربية في ظل اعتمادها الكبير على واردات الأغذية وتنامي ندرة المياه التي تواجهها بالإضافة للأهمية التي ألحقتها هذه الدول بالتكامل الإقليمي العربي في مجال الزراعة. هنالك فقط إحدى عشرة دولة عربية عضواً بمنظمة التجارة العالمية حتى الآن، ويبدو أن الالتزامات التي قدمتها هذه الدول في إطار اتفاقية الزراعة ستكفل لها مرونة كافية في الوقت الحاضر إلا أنها تنطوي على بعض المُحدِّدات التي سوف تُؤثر على تصميم السياسات الزراعية في هذه الدول مُستقبلاً، خاصة في مجال الدعم المحلي ودعم الصادرات والحصول على وقائية أكبر.

من أهم القضايا التي تشغل بال الدول العربية في المفاوضات الحالية والمستقبلية حول الزراعة ما يلي: (1) شروط الانضمام للمنظمة، (2) الحصول على مرونة كافية تُمكنها من تنمية قدراتها الزراعية، (3) زيادة النفاذ إلى الأسواق الخارجية و(4) استقرار الأسواق الزراعية الداخلية. كما يُشير تقييم أثر المزيد من الإصلاحات التجارية (مستخدمين نموذج محاكاة السياسات التجارية الزراعية ATPSM) إلى أن الدول العربية مُجتمععة ستحصل على فوائد متواضعة على مستوى الرفاهية الكلية ولكنها ستواجه عُجوزات مُتصاعدة في تجارتها الزراعية.

1 منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة، المكتب الإقليمي للشرق الأدنى، القاهرة، مصر، فاكس: (+202) 3373419 أو 7495981، بريد إلكتروني: Nasredin.Elamin@fao.org

2 منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة، المكتب الإقليمي للشرق الأدنى، القاهرة، مصر، بريد إلكتروني: mohamed\_abdelgadir@hotmail.com